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DON'T KNOW MUCH ABOUT HISTORY:
CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT, PRACTICE, AND
PRESIDENTIAL POWER
DAVID SCHULTZ*

I. INTRODUCTION
What is to be learned about the constitutional powers of the presidency
from George Washington? As the first president, there is no question that
Washington helped define the office, much in the same way that every
president, by virtue of his personality, experiences, and decisions, has
defined the history and character of the position. This is true whether it be
the impact that a Thomas Jefferson, an Abraham Lincoln, or a Ronald
Reagan had upon the office. The personality or psychological makeup of
those serving as president has an enormous influence on the specific powers
that a particular person exercises.'
George Washington seems unique. Maybe it is because surveys
consistently rank Washington as one of the best presidents ever.2 Or
perhaps it is because he was the first president, even if not necessarily the
best, and thus able to define the office simply by being its first occupant.
However, there are two additional reasons offered by John Yoo regarding
the importance of Washington's presidency. First, Yoo claimed that the
Framers of 1787 designed the office of the presidency with Washington in
mind.
A singular factor influenced the ratification of the Constitution's
article on the Presidency: all understood that George Washington
would be elected the first President. It is impossible to understate
Professor, School of Business, Hamline University, and Professor, School of Law, University of
Minnesota.
1. See JAMES DAVID BARBER, PRESIDENTIAL CHARACTER: PREDICTING PERFORMANCE IN
THE WHITE HOUSE, 7 (Prentice-Hall, 2008) (1977) (describing how the personality character of
presidents affect their approach to their duties).
2. Lincoln Ranked Best President by Historians, MSNBC (Feb. 16, 2010),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com /id/29211562/#slice-2; FDR Rated Best President in Survey of 238
1,
2010),
POST
(July
THE
HUFFINGTON
Scholars,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07/01/fdr-rated-best-president- n 632182.html.
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the standing of the 'Father of the Country' among his fellow
Americans. He had established America's fundamental
constitutional principle-civilian control of the military-before
there was even a Constitution. Throughout his command of the
Continental Army, General Washington scrupulously observed
civilian orders and restrained himself when a Congress on the run
granted him dictatorial powers. He had even put down, by his mere
presence, a potential coup d'etat by his officers in 1783.
Washington cannot be quantified as an element of constitutional
law, but he was probably more important than any other factor.3
In addition to his assertion that Washington defined the presidency, Yoo
also asserts that his eight years in office were critical in giving real meaning
or definition to the formal powers of the office outlined in Article II.
Washington's presidency completed the picture of the presidency only
briefly sketched out in the Constitution.
Washington filled these gaps with a number of foundational
decisions-several on a par with those made during the writing and
ratification of the Constitution itself. His desire to govern by
consensus sometimes led him to seek cooperation with the other
branches. He was a republican before he was a Federalist, but
ultimately Washington favored an energetic, independent executive,
even at the cost of political harmony.4
Assuming Yoo is correct, what does it say about the Constitution and the
presidency if both were based upon a cult of personality? Should one really
care about Washington's exploits? From a historical perspective, his
presidency is important, but there is a deeper meaning and significance
attached to the Washington presidency when it comes to the Constitution
and the powers of the presidency.
Washington was the first president, serving at a time when the Framers
of the Constitution could observe actions. His actions set a constitutional
mold in two ways. First, with his presidency coming so soon after the
Constitutional Convention, it offers a possible test regarding the Framers'
intent. Specifically, if no one (such as the Framers and ratifiers of the
Constitution) objected, then his actions must be constitutional and therefore
offer an operationalization of the Framers' intent. Second, his presidency
sets precedent for defining the powers of the office, and what the office is
allowed to do constitutionally. In effect, significant constitutional deference
should be offered to what Washington did because his historical actions
constitute legal precedent, or evidence regarding the scope of Article II

3. JOHN YOO, CRISIS AND COMMAND: A HISTORY OF EXECUTIVE POWER FROM GEORGE
WASHINGTON TO GEORGE W. BUSH, 53 (2009).

4. Id. at 54.
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powers. Thus, there is a normative component here in terms of defining
presidential power-the history of the Washington presidency is a source of
constitutional argument.
Using history as a constitutional argument to support presidential power
is not unusual,5 at least for Yoo. In his capacity as White House Legal
Counsel, Yoo extensively cited presidential history as constitutional
precedent for many of the legal actions of the Bush presidency. 6 Other legal
memoranda defining the scope of presidential power to engage the war on
terror similarly cited history.7 Yoo also does the same in The Powers of War
and Peace: The Constitution and Foreign Affairs after 9/118 Even in his
most recent book, Crisis and Command: Executive Power from George
Washington to George W.Bush, out of which his comment on Washington
for this conference was based, history is extensively referenced in support
of constitutional authority. 9
Finally, on numerous occasions, including in United States v. CurtissWright Export Corporation" where the Sutherland thesis is used to defend
presidential power, the Supreme Court has offered history as evidence for
constitutional argument. More recent Supreme Court cases testing the limits
of presidential power in a post-9/11 world have also resorted to history to
bolster constitutional arguments." This is neither the invocation of the
Framers' intent nor of the use of history, in terms of discussing the
historical facts of a past precedent and seeking to apply them to a present
problem. 2 Instead, it is citation or discussion of historical events to serve as
5. Louis HENKtN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 26 (1990)
("The life of the Constitution, too, has not been logic or textual hermeneutics, but experience, and
constitutional history has supplied answers to some of the questions that constitutional text and
,original intent' left unanswered.") ("history has given the President large powers.") Id.at 29.
6. John C. Yoo, The President's Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations
Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL
COUNSEL (Sep. 25, 2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/warpowers925.htm [hereinafter
Yoo Memorandum].
7. Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National Security Agency Describedby
the President, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL (Jan. 19, 2006), available at
Wiretapping
[hereinafter
http://www.justice.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf
Memorandum]; Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL (Jan. 22, 2002) [hereinafter Detainee Memorandum];
Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§2340-2340A, U.S.DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL (Aug. 1,2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memogonzales-augl .pdf [hereinafter Torture Memorandum].
8. JOHN YOo, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005).
9. JOHN YOO, CRISIS AND COMMAND: EXECUTIVE POWER FROM GEORGE WASHINGTON
TO GEORGE W. BUSH (2010).

10. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
11. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). See also District of Columbia v.
Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) as another example of using history to clarify constitutional
meaning (Second Amendment).
12. Richard A. Primus, JudicialPower and Mobilizable History, 65 MD. L. REV. 171 (2006)
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constitutional precedent. 3
Yet, invocation of history for legal argument poses a problem. 4 Heidi
Kitrosser raises the issue of Washington and his disputes with Congress,
asserting the following: "These early controversies thus do not necessarily
stand for more than the notion that the executive can raise policy objections
to inter-branch information requests, and that those objections are subject to
responses by the requesting parties."' 5 Kitrosser's point is that assertions or
decisions made by Washington might simply be policy or discretionary
choices, and constitutional significance should not necessarily be attached
to them. More broadly, uses of presidential history, especially that of the
Washington administration, implicate what shall be called a translation
problem. Specifically, when do acts, instances, or facts of history translate
into constitutional precedent? More simply put, when does historical
practice count as the basis for constitutional law or precedent? Implicit in
Yoo's historical accounts is a normative claim or argument for broad
presidential power.
This article raises some questions regarding what we can learn from
history for constitutional argument. It concedes, generally, that historical
facts can support or buttress constitutional argument, but more specifically,
it contends that acts undertaken by George Washington are problematic
assertions for presidential power, especially those that assert what Kitrosser
would call "supremacist" or broad, if not exclusive, claims for presidential
foreign policy authority. 6 To do that, this article first describes how history
is employed as constitutional argument for presidential power. Then the
piece critiques this type of argumentation, claiming that generalizations
from practices, policies, or acts of discretion during the Washington
presidency being used as constitutional argument are problematic on several
grounds. The overall thesis is that while history may be an appropriate tool
for making or sustaining constitutional arguments, what is needed is some
rule of translation explaining why, when, and how the past is relevant to
defending presidential power.

(contrasting originalism with the mobilizing of history to make constitutional arguments).
13. Jeffrey S. Sutton, The Role of History in Judging Disputes about the Meaning of the
Constitution, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1173, 1176-7 (2009) (noting the increased reliance of the
Court to appeal to history to address constitutional questions).
14. David A.J. Richards, Interpretation and Historiography, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 489 (1985)
(contrasting legal and historical interpretation). See also HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND
METHOD 289-304 (1989).
15. Heidi Kitrosser, Supremely Opaque?: Accountability, Transparency, and Presidential
Supremacy, LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER SERIES, RESEARCH PAPER NO. 10-67, 17 (2010),
availableat http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1721609.
16. Id. at4.
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II. HISTORY, PRACTICE, AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER
Efforts to invoke history as constitutional argument for presidential
power operate in two ways, especially when it comes to George
Washington. First, practices confirm intent of the Framers, and therefore,
strong presidential power is in-line with the Constitution. Second, practices
create independent constitutional justification for strong presidential
powers. In both cases, history or past practice defends strong presidential
power. The importance of history to constitutional argument is underscored
by Kelly, Harbison, and Belz, authors of one of the most famous books on
this subject, when they declare:
Yet American constitutional history is more than an account of the
written Constitution, important as that instrument has been in the
national political life. Constitutional history goes beyond the
history of constitutional law because the actual constitution of
government has consisted in practices and understandings shaped as
much by political exigency and constitutional theory as by the
17
prescriptions of the documentary text.
For these scholars, the actual Constitution of the United States is more
than mere parchment. It includes both the written text and practice. What is
constitutional in the United States, and the limits of what American
presidents can do, is explicated by a combination of text and practice. Thus,
practice, tradition, and history are a constitutional guide.
More generically, there is a basic question: What can one learn from
history? At the most cynical extreme, Henry Ford is famously quoted for
stating, "History is more or less bunk,"18 meaning we can learn little, if
anything, from it. Others have not similarly reduced the past to irrelevance.
Historical scholarship has been replete with efforts to find a meaning or20
purpose in the past.19 Christian history saw a progressive aspect to history,
one which St. Augustine saw as history unveiling God's purpose or plan
over time. 2' G.W.F. Hegel depicted history as the
23 unfolding of reason,"
Karl Marx as a succession of class conflicts.

Still, other writers or

17. 1 ALFRED H. KELLY, WINFRED A. HARBISON & HERMAN BELZ, THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT xix (1991).
18. Charles Wheeler, Fight to Disarm His Life 's Work, Henry Ford Vows, CHI. TRIB., May
25, 1916, 10.
19. JOHN BURROW, A HISTORY OF HISTORIES: Epics, CHRONICLES, ROMANCES, AND
INQUIRIES FROM HERODOTUS AND THUCYDIDES TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY xv (2007).
20. Id.at 170-173.
21.
AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD 457, 487-490 (1972) (criticizing cyclical theories of history
and arguing that there is a linear purpose to it in revealing God's plan. See also CHARLES NORRIS
COCHRANE, CHRISTIANITY AND CLASSICAL CULTURE 474-486 (1980).
22. G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 84 (1912).
KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, COMMUNIST MANIFESTO, reprinted in THE MARX23.
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historians sought meaning and significance in the past,24 whether it be
Tolstoy who found meaning in the everyday private activities of people,25 or
Thomas Carlyle who saw it residing in the actions of great individuals.26
Constitutional arguments that are used to defend presidential power
based on history are often invoked to confirm the Framers' intent.27 The
intent of the Framers is a well-accepted technique for constitutional
interpretation. 28 Efforts to invoke their intent are used in conjunction with
textualism, seeking to provide clarification regarding what certain words
mean, such as "commander in chief' in Article I, Section 2 of the
Constitution.29 Additionally, characteristic of this logic is invoking
Alexander Hamilton, especially FederalistNo. 70,30 for arguments of strong
presidential power.3' Often quoted is the following Hamilton statement:
"The ingredients which constitute energy in the Executive are, first, unity;
secondly, duration; thirdly, an adequate provision for its support; fourthly,
competent powers. 32 In FederalistNo. 74, Hamilton also stated:
Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war
most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the
exercise of power by a single hand. The direction of war implies
the direction of the common strength; and the power of directing
and employing the common strength forms a usual and essential

ENGELS READER, 469,473 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 1978).
24. See EDWARD HALLETT CARR, WHAT IS HISTORY? 109-133 (1963); HAYDEN WHITE,
METAHISTORY 2-4, 427-30 (1985); R.G. COLLINGWOOD, THE IDEA OF HISTORY 9-13 (1980);
LEON J. GOLDSTEIN, THE WHAT AND WHY OF HISTORY 81-92 (1996); LEON J. GOLDSTEIN,
HISTORICAL KNOWING xi-xiv (1976) (describing history in part as a form of knowledge seeking
to make sense of the past).
25. ISAIAH BERLIN, RUSSIAN THINKERS 22-34 (Henry Hardy & Aileen Kelly eds., 1978).
26.

THOMAS CARLYLE, ON HEROES AND HERO WORSHIP AND THE HEROIC IN HISTORY

(2010).
27. See generally: LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMER'S
CONSTITUTION (1988); PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12 (1991); Paul
Brest, The Misconceived Questfor the Original Understanding,60 B.U.L. REV. 204 (1980).
28. BOBBITT, supra note 27, at 13, 25. However, Bobbitt notes that history is invoked in
terms of intent of framers as one of the modalities of constitutional argument. He does not
describe history as a modality in terms of looking at post-ratification deeds or acts by actors such
as presidents as a basis of a historical argument sustaining constitutional precedent.
29. Brest, supra note 27, at 206; BOBBITT, supra note 27, at 56.
30. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 454-55 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin F. Wright
ed.,1937). See also: YOO, CRISIS AND COMMAND, supra note 3, at 40-51 (invoking Hamilton to
justify presidential war powers).
31. HENKJN, supra note 5, at 21 (describing how "Alexander Hamilton early set forth an
executive view of the grand design of the Constitution for the conduct of foreign affairs").
32. FEDERALIST No. 70, supra note 30, at 455.
See also: Yoo Memorandum, supra note 6, at 2-3, where he cites to Alexander Hamilton and
the FEDERALIST as support for broad presidential foreign policy powers; Detainee Memorandum,
supra note 7, at 12 (citing Alexander Hamilton's Pacificus No. I for this proposition);
Wiretapping Memorandum, supra note 7, at 6-7.
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part of the definition of the executive authority. 3
In FederalistNo. 70, Hamilton also relies upon historical examples-often
to Rome-to defend his gloss on presidential power and the Constitution.34
The lessons of history are invoked as constitutional argument. Hamilton is
not alone in resorting to history to make a constitutional argument about
presidential power. The best example of this resides with Justice Sutherland
35
and the case of United States v. Curtiss-Wright.

In Curtiss-Wright, Congress had passed a joint resolution empowering
the President to embargo the shipment of articles of war to countries
engaged in armed conflict when, in his judgment, such action would be in
the interest of the resolution, which applied to sales within the United
States. The President forbade sales to the principals in the Chaco war
between Bolivia and Paraguay. The Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation sold
arms of war [aircraft machine guns] to Bolivia and was charged with
violation of the act of Congress and the President's order. The corporation
challenged the validity of the act claiming it to be an illegal delegation of
power to the President. The Supreme Court rejected this claim.
In writing for the Court, Justice Sutherland first distinguished between
constitutional arrangements such as the division of congressional and
presidential power in domestic versus foreign affairs.
The two classes of powers are different, both in respect of their
origin and their nature. The broad statement that the federal
government can exercise no powers except those specifically
enumerated in the Constitution, and such implied powers as are
necessary and proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers, is
categorically true only in respect of our internal affairs.36
Thus, for Sutherland, the normal restrictions on delegation which would
apply to domestic issues do not have the same force in international or
foreign relations. Congress can delegate to the president in foreign affairs in
ways that it could not do so domestically. Beyond setting up a dichotomy
between domestic and foreign affairs, Sutherland also constructs a theory
about foreign policy power, suggesting a genealogy from the British Crown
to the United States.
As a result of the separation from Great Britain by the colonies,
acting as a unit, the powers of external sovereignty passed from the
Crown not to the colonies severally, but to the colonies in their
collective and corporate capacity as the United States of America.
Even before the Declaration, the colonies were a unit in foreign

33.
34.
35.
36.

FEDERALIST NO. 74, supra note 30, at 482.
Id. at 456-57.
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
ld. at 315-16.
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affairs, acting through a common agency-namely, the Continental
Congress, composed of delegates from the thirteen colonies. That
agency exercised the powers of war and peace, raised an army,
created a navy, and finally adopted the Declaration of
Independence. Rulers come and go; governments end and forms of
government change; but sovereignty survives. A political society
cannot endure without a supreme will somewhere. Sovereignty is
never held in suspense. When, therefore, the external sovereignty of
Great Britain in respect of the colonies ceased, it immediately
passed to the Union. That fact was given practical application
almost at once. The treaty of peace, made on September 3, 1783,
was concluded between his Britannic Majesty and the 'United
States of America.' 8 Stat.-European Treaties-80.
The Union existed before the Constitution, which was ordained
and established among other things to form 'a more perfect Union.'
Prior to that event it is clear that the Union, declared by the Articles
of Confederation to be 'perpetual,' was the sole possessor of
external sovereignty, and in the Union it remained without change
save in so far as the Constitution in express terms qualified its
exercise...
It results that the investment of the federal government with the
powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative
grants of the Constitution.37
Having established that sovereign power passed from the Crown to the
United States, Sutherland then contends that much of this power passed to
the President, stating that the, "exclusive power of the President as the sole
organ of the federal government in the field of international relations-[is]
a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of
Congress."3 8 This lineage of foreign policy power from the Crown to the
President provides the history to support the constitutional authority of
Roosevelt to issue the embargo order.
Curtiss-Wright and the Sutherland thesis provide powerful precedent
for significant or exclusive presidential power in foreign affairs. The basis
of that claim rests tremendously on historical practice-the passing of
sovereign power-and other acts that seem to confirm presidential power.
Conversely, Youngstown v. Sawyer39 is normally thought of as a case
sharply limiting presidential power; here, the authority of Truman to seize
steel mills to avert a strike."n Even in Justice Jackson's famous concurrence,
37.
38.
39.
40.
Sheet &

Id. at 316-17.
Id. at 319.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
Roy E. Brownell, The Coexistence of United States v. Curtiss-Wright and Youngstown
Tube v. Sawyer in NationalSecurity Jurisprudence, 16 J. L. & POL. 1, 8-9 (2000).
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he, too, cites Curtiss-Wright and references history or historical examples to
support his opinion.4 While, generally, Jackson is cited to reference his trifold classification of presidential power in foreign affairs,42 he does so in
the context of stating that, "I have heretofore, and do now, give to the
enumerated powers the scope and elasticity afforded by what seem to be
reasonable practical implications instead of the rigidity dictated by a
doctrinaire textualism."43 History or practice helps justify the constitutional
classification of power the president possesses.
In sum, constitutional arguments on presidential power, especially in
foreign affairs, depart from the text. The constitutional power of the
presidency encompasses extra textual powers, often sourced in past
practice. As a result, there is almost an Edmund Burke-like quality to the
arguments here. In commenting on the nature of society, Burke stated:
Society is indeed a contract .... It is a partnership in all science; a
partnership in all art; a partnership in every virtue, and in all
perfection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in
many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those
who are living, but between those who are living, those who are
dead, and those who are to be born."
As Russell Kirk describes Burke's constitutionalism, it is something more
than a written document, but instead the product of "long-established
practices, customs, beliefs, and interests."45 The Constitution is in fact a
living document, one connecting the past to the present, with the former
serving as precedent for current deeds or actions. Thus, history or practice
can serve as constitutional argument or justification, as if laying an edifice
for the present.

III. THE LIMITS OF HISTORICAL ARGUMENT
Here is the problem: how does history or past practice translate into
constitutional argument? Is every act or decision of a president, especially
Washington, equivalent to a constitutional claim? Particularly, when no
manifest or expressed statement makes such an assertion (and when there is
no indication that others similarly construed such a meaning)? How do we
distinguish some choices made by Washington as merely examples of

41. Youngstown, supra note 39, at 641-43.
42. Brownell, supra note 40, at 47; Anthony Simones, The Reality of Curtiss-Wright, 16 N.
ILL. U. L. REV. 411,419 (1996).
43. Youngstown, supra note 39, at 640.
44.

EDMUND

BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION

IN FRANCE 194-95 (Penguin

Books 1969).
45. Russell Kirk, Edmund Burke and the Constitution, THE INTERCOLLEGIATE REV. 3
(Winter 1985-86).
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policy being made or discretion exercised, versus raising them to the level
of constitutional argument? Yoo does not say or address this concern in any
of his writings, rendering a problem. There must be some useful rule, tool,
or technique to clarify when history or practice in fact is an appropriate
constitutional argument. Short of constructing this rule, there are some
points that can be raised to question the limits of historical argument.
First, invoking Hamilton, especially the Federalist, is problematic. Of
course, there is the question of whether the FederalistPapers are rightfully
considered an appropriate or definitive gloss on the intent of the
constitutional Framers, as opposed to being political propaganda simply to
urge the New York legislature to ratify the Constitution.46 Second, even if
they are appropriate to ascertaining intent, Hamilton's role as a
constitutional Framer is questionable, especially in terms of presidential
power. Hamilton gave an "inflammatory" speech47 at the Convention,
advocating that the President should serve for life.48 The speech was not
well received by the other delegates, especially because of his praise for the
British government.49 After giving this speech, he silently remained at the
Convention for a few more weeks, returned to New York, and never
returned." Thus, both his extreme arguments for presidential power, which
were rejected by the Convention,5' and his absence from the deliberations,
question the value of invoking him.
There is a clear problem in using historical practice under the
Washington administration, either as confirmation of the Framers' intent or
as independent justification for presidential power. One problem is simply
the issue of historical accuracy. For example, many scholars have
questioned Sutherland's historical account in Curtiss-Wright.2 The passing
of sovereignty from the Crown to the presidency has been heavily
criticized. Additionally, historical facts are not given.53 Facts are merely
facts when placed into a context for explanatory purposes.54 History and
facts must be interpreted, and they are viewed through the horizon of the

46.
47.

JACOB E. COOKE, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 54-5 (1982).
RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 233 (2004); LEVY, supra note 27, at 34-5.
48. 1 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 289 (1966);
JAMES MADISON, NOTES ON THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 137-39

(Ohio University Press 1966) (1840).
49. CHERNOW, supra note 47, at 233.
50. Id. at 235.
51. HENKIN, supra note 5, at 22; LEVY, supra note 27, at 34-8.

52.

See: CHARLES A. LOFGREN, GOVERNMENT FROM REFLECTION AND CHOICE

167 (1986);

Louis Fisher, Evolution of Presidentialand Congressional Powers in Foreign Affairs, in THE
PRESIDENCY, AND THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT 20 (Louis W. Koenig, James C. Hsuing & King-

Yu Chang eds., 1985); David M. Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr.
Justice Sutherland's Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467 (1946).
53. CARR, supra note 24, at 8-30; COLLINGWOOD, supra note 24, at 133.
54. COLLINGWOOD, supra note 24, at 133.
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present interpreter." This means that events of Washington's administration
are not "brute facts" that stand on their own." They must be interpreted.
Some events are selected to construct a historical explanation or narrative,
of which then the latter is framed into a constitutional argument. Simply
put, history does not just exist, it is reconstructed and there are problems in
culling occurrences into relevant legal claims. 7
Another equally serious problem deals with the language of politics.
Even if Sutherland were accurate in his history, he misses something far
more important. Specifically, it is how terms and concepts that were used
by the British changed meanings when they were imported to the colonies,
and then eventually used in American political discourse, including in the
Constitution.
Historian Bernard Bailyn writes in The Ideological Origins of the

American Revolution,58 that as the American colonies pressed their
grievances to England via the First and then Second Continental
Congresses, one of the problems was that the Americans and the British
were using the same language, but talking past one another. At root, three
's9
political terms were in dispute during the Revolution: "representation,
6
0
"sovereignty," and "constitutionalism."'" The real revolution was over the
meaning of these three terms, and their impact on Americans' perceptions
about politics and governance.62
Beginning with the concept of representation, one of the primary
objections the American colonists had with the British taxing tea and other
goods, was the famous claim: "no taxation without representation." In
making this claim, Americans asserted that the colonies did not vote for
anyone serving in the British Parliament, the body that voted on taxes and
other policies affecting America. Thus, the claim was that there was nobody
directly elected by the people in the colonies and therefore there was no
representation. 63 The British, however, did not understand this argument.
Instead, they asserted that the American colonies were virtually represented
in the British Parliament. The MPs who were serving there, even though not
elected by anyone in the colonies, could essentially represent the interests of
those back in North America.' This debate over direct versus virtual

55. GADAMER, supranote 14, at 268-273.
56. See: G.E.M. Anscombe, Brute Facts, 18 ANALYSIS, 69 (1958) (discussing how facts are
not given but are defined by theories).
57. COLLINGWOOD, supra note 24, at 242.

58.

BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 161.
Id.at 198.
Id.at 175.
Id.at 161.
Id.at 166.
BAILYN, supra note 58, at 167.

64.

(1967).
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representation was one of the first political disagreements between the
American colonies and England. The two sides were using the same
word-representation-but they meant very different things when invoking
the concept. Americans demanded a direct and real voice in the British
Parliament and over their own affairs, and the British were not providing
that in the way the colonists demanded.
The second concept over which there was debate involved the concept
of sovereignty. Sovereignty refers to who holds political power.65 Political
sovereignty refers to ultimately who is in charge of the state or nation. For
the British, sovereignty resided in Parliament. It was the ultimate source of
political authority and power, including in and over the colonies.66 British
thinkers, such as John Locke, argued against claims by the king that
sovereignty was lodged in the monarchy. This was essentially the argument
between Sir Robert Filmer and Locke.67 Locke's arguments invoking the
social contract metaphor to explain the origin of government were at the
heart of this claim.68 The Glorious Revolution of 1688 had essentially
validated Locke's claim, and therefore Parliament was viewed as the
sovereign body in England.69
However, the colonists had a different sense of whom or what was
sovereign. Instead of accepting the British view or perspective that saw
Parliament as sovereign,7" they argued that ultimate sovereignty resided
with the people. 7 This is the assertion that the American Founding Fathers
adopted.
Thus, they both accepted the argument that the people were sovereign,
and they also took Locke true to his word that the people created civil
society and government. Together, that meant that the people ruled or were
sovereign, and that did not simply mean the people of England. Instead, the
colonies, especially as a result of all of the self-rule that they had
experienced, at least up until recently, were also sovereign and were entitled
to a say over their own affairs.7" The colonies were entitled to a say over
taxation, over the control of their own representatives, the selection of their
governors, judges, and all the other affairs that affected their governance in
North America. They resented the way Parliament and King George III

65.
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Two TREATiSES OF GOVERNMENT 577 (1986).

70.
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treated them-like a colony. As it became clear on July 4, 1776, the thirteen
states in North America were actually sovereign, they were their own
country, and entitled to rule themselves.
Finally, there is the notion of constitutionalism. Constitutionalism is an
ancient term, going back to at least Aristotle in terms of its first use.73
Aristotle used the term "constitution" to refer to forms of government,
depending on who ruled. 74 Over time, the concept of constitutionalism
retained that basic meaning, but it evolved to reference the basic structures,
"grundnorm," or rules that constitute a government.75 As the term evolved
in Western Europe and North America, constitutionalism referred to a
government of limited powers, one that must often adhere to rule of law,
procedural due process or regularity, and eventually to a commitment to the
protection of individual rights. 76 At the time of the American Revolution,
the British equated Parliament with the Constitution.77 Since England
lacked a written constitution, someone or something had to define what was
constitutional. This was a task set for Parliament. It defined what was
constitutional. The idea of saying that Parliament was acting
unconstitutionally was a non sequitur. Parliament was the final word on
what was constitutional and whatever it said went, in terms of what was
permitted.78

The American concept of constitutionalism departed from this British
notion. For Americans, a constitution was something distinct from the
government.7 9 The Constitution served to define the powers of the
government and to place limits upon it. Parliament or the government could
act unconstitutionally by failing to follow the limits prescribed upon them
by the Constitution. In this case, the Americans came to prefer a written
constitution. Thus, when the American colonies began to argue that the
King and Parliament were acting unconstitutionally, violating the rights of
British citizens as Thomas Jefferson originally argued, they were again
making a claim that the British just did not understand. How could the
British government act unconstitutionally when the government, especially
Parliament, decided what was constitutional?
Taken together, Bailyn argues that the real American Revolution was a
political one involving a dramatic change in meaning of the concepts of

73. CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN, 36-38
(Cornell University Press 1977) (1958).
74. Aristotle, Politics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1113, 1184-85 (Richard
McKeon, ed., 1941).
75. HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW (University of California Press 1967).
76. JAMES T. MCHUGH, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITIONS 5-10 (2002).
77. BAILYN, supra note 58, at 178-79.
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representation, sovereignty, constitutionalism, and the idea of rights.8"
Americans came to believe that they were sovereign, that they were entitled
to their own choice in representatives, and that a government was limited by
a constitution that defined how it operated and what rights the people had.
The Declaration of Independence, as already noted, encapsulated and
summarized the emerging new political vocabulary of the United States of
America.
It should be easy to see how the Americanization of these three political
concepts eventually affected the ideas behind the drafting of the
Constitution in 1787. Ideas such as the written constitution to define the
powers of the government, are, of course, the starting point for
understanding the document. Ideas such as separation of powers, checks
and balances, and even the notion ofjudicial review emerged out of the idea
that the Constitution stands about the government to limit it, subject to the
sovereign rights of the people to decide what the document means and how
the government should operate. All of these ideas are part of the process of
placing constitutional checks upon the power of the government.
Moreover, because of the abuses of power that the colonists
experienced with Parliament and King George, the Constitution that
eventually emerged in 1787 sought to place limits upon the exercise of
authority, to prevent any one branch of government or person from
exercising too much unchecked power. This idea of the constitution as a
check upon government, and as a document that defines and limits power,
is at the heart of any notion of an American public service ethic even to this
day. So too are ideas that the people are ultimately sovereign. The first three
words of the Constitution-"We the people"---capture this notion. Finally,
the concept of representation, that individuals deserve a voice in their
government, would be powerful in the writing of the Constitution. While
the 1787 document did not expressly grant people the right to vote, it did set
up mechanisms for public officials to be chosen by some of the people or
by their representatives.
It was not only the experiences with England and George III that
framed the ideas that would eventually be incorporated into the Constitution
of 1787. There was also the Articles of Confederation, America's first
constitution, which was adopted in 1781, that also framed the backdrop for
the 1787 Constitutional Convention.8 The Articles created more of a
decentralized political system to govern the United States. There was a
national Congress that gave each state equal representation, but there was
no Supreme Court or federal court system. Additionally, there was no
independent president, but rather a rotating one picked by Congress. Action
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in Congress required unanimity, and the national government had limited
authority to raise revenue. While some would argue that the Articles'
government respected local control and rights, many criticized it as weak
and ineffective. Its lack of ability to raise revenue, weak control over
commerce, and ability of states to veto actions, all lead a growing chorus of
individuals, such as Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, to believe
that revisions to the Articles were needed. Finally, events such as Shay's
rebellion in Massachusetts, a skirmish by Revolutionary war veterans, led
others to conclude that perhaps the Articles' government was ineffective.
It was against this backdrop that the 1787 Philadelphia Constitutional
Convention took place. There was the fear of creating too strong of a
national government or power, less a return to the abuses experienced with
England. Conversely, the Articles' government had insufficient authority to
act; a balance was needed. This was clearly true when it came to
presidential power, including dealing with foreign affairs.
Sutherland has been rightly criticized for his views on sovereignty and
its genealogy from the British Crown to effectively the president. s2 If Bailyn
is correct, American concepts of sovereignty shift it from the Crown to the
people, not the government, let alone the president. Second, while British
notions of constitutionalism might have a Burkean flavor that blends text
and practice, the American conception of the term subordinated the
practices of the government to the Constitution. This too would include the
practices of the president. Thus, practice or tradition as a supplement to
defining what is constitutional can be questioned in the American context as
a viable basis for forging presidential power.
Language philosophers note how words garner meaning in part due to
their context or use in relation to other words.8 3 The same is true with
political concepts. Not only did the British concepts take on a new meaning
when applied to the American setting, but there is also a gap between the
rhetoric and application of the words.
Efforts in recent years to understand colonial and early America have
often taken two, if not more, disconnected paths. There is a body of
literature in political science and history seeking to ascertain the nature and
origin of American political values and to define the "Founding" principles
of American politics and political thought. This body of literature, in
defining American political values as primarily Lockean-Liberal s4 or
82. Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation:An Historical
Reassessment, 83 YALE L. J. 1, 32 (1973); David M. Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An
Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's Theory, 55 YALE L. J. 467 (1946); Simones, supra note 42,
at 414-15.
83. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, para. 43 (1968) (describing
how the meaning of words are located in their use within a language).
84. See: CARL BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY
OF POLITICAL IDEAS (1970); LOUIs HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA: AN
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Harringtonian-Republican" (and to a lesser extent indebted to Scottish
Enlightenment or Christian-Religious values),86 has taken somewhat of a
rhetorical or linguistic turn87 and focused almost exclusively upon the
political rhetoric, political writings, 88 or concepts ue
used by key Founders
including Madison, Hamilton, Jefferson, Wilson, and Morris, among
others.89
There is another body of scholarship and inquiry that has been
concerned with a series of questions including the sources of the American
legal system,9" the transition in America from British (common) law to
American statutory law, 91 the "legal" nature of the American Revolution, 92
the emergence of the American legal system in the post-revolutionary
period, 93 and the role of British legal scholars including Cooke, Bracton,
INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT SINCE THE REVOLUTION (1955); JOHN
PATRICK DIGGINS, THE LOST SOUL OF AMERICAN POLITICS: VIRTUE, SELF-INTEREST, AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERALISM (1986); STEVEN M. DWORETZ, THE UNVARNISHED DOCTRINE:
LOCKE, LIBERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1990).
85. See: J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL
THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLIC TRADITION 506-553 (1975); J. G.A. Pocock,
Republicanism and IdeologiaAmericana, J. HIST. IDEAS, 325-346 (1987).

86.

See: W.C. MCWILLIAMS, THE IDEA OF FRATERNITY IN AMERICA (1974); P. MILLER,
INTO THE WILDERNESS (1956); and GARY WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE
FEDERALIST (1982). Other authors have noted the appearance of other "tongues" or influences in
early American political thought. See: 1.Kramnick, The "Great National Discussion": The
Discourse ofPolitics in 1787,45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 3 (1988).
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and Blackstone as influencing all this.94 These questions are predominantly
asked by legal historians who, for the most part, do not approach the
questions of the political founding in the rhetorical way raised by the first
group noted here, but instead address the topic from an institutional slant.
Moreover, legal analysis of early America often examines documents, such
as case law and statutes, which are different from those studied in the first
group.
The divergent paths of these two groups raise interesting questions for
the study of early America and its founding. Among these questions is
whether the two approaches to the founding are distinct because of their
contrasting objects of inquiry or whether or not the work done in one field
can inform the other. There is also the question of how the evidence of one
field supports or contradicts conclusions reached in the other. The
significance of this gap between rhetorical versus legal approaches to
studying the founding are especially acute when it comes to understanding
terms such as "property." While the rhetoric of property suggested its
protection and linkage to liberty, the colonial and its extensive regulation of
it question the viability of relying simply on statements about it to
determine how it was actually valued or viewed by the Framers.
The changed meaning of British legal concepts in the American setting,
as well as the gap between the rhetoric and reality of what these terms
meant, call into question the viability of simply referencing historical
words-such as commander in chief-without also understanding what
they meant in a new American context. The problem with meaning or text
extends beyond constitutionalism, representation, sovereignty (for Bailyn),
and property, but also encompasses commander in chief.
Barron and Lederman examine the historical context and meaning of
"commander-in-chief."95 Their analysis reveals that the earliest uses of the
term, "apparently derives from the reign of King Charles I in the
seventeenth century, when it denoted a purely military post under the
AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA (Rita & Robert
Kimber trans., 1980); GEORGE DARGO, LAW IN THE NEW REPUBLIC: PRIVATE LAW AND THE
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command of political superiors. ' They also note how, in the British
context, the title commander-in-chief gave its holder little discretion and
authority beyond direction from Parliament. 97 During the Revolutionary
War, this narrow understanding of the term also framed and limited General
Washington's command of the troops as he took direction from the
Continental Congress.98

Moreover, the term commander-in-chief, or similar phrasing, appears in
many post-independence state constitutions. There was little consensus
regarding what substantive powers it conferred, 99 although Barron and
Lederman conclude that the consensus was that the powers of these person
who held this title would be strictly limited by law.' 0 A similar
understanding was present at the 1787 Constitutional Convention, although
the paucity of the debates makes it difficult to ascertain the exact
understanding of the term. However, Barron and Lederman again conclude
that: "Suffice it to say, then, that as the constitutional convention
commenced in the summer of 1787, there was no clear and common
understanding of the title 'Commander in Chief that necessarily included a
power to disregard validly enacted laws regulating the conduct of war."''
The point in reciting this brief history is to establish that whatever
meaning there was attached to commander-in-chief in Great Britain, its
meaning had changed once imported to the United States and viewed their
the context and experiences of King George III and the Articles of
Confederation government. Underscoring the changed meaning or context
for the term was reflected in state conventions held to adopt the
Constitution. For example, in North Carolina one speaker noted:
A very material difference may be observed between this power,
and the authority of the king of Great Britain under similar
circumstances. The king of Great Britain is not only the
commander-in-chief of the land and naval forces, but has power, in
time of war, to raise fleets and armies. He has also authority to
declare war. The president has not the power of declaring war by his
own authority, nor that of raising fleets and armies. These powers
are vested in others hands. 102
George Tucker, in his gloss on the clause similarly stated:
The first is, that he shall be commander in chief of the army and

96. Id.at 772.
97. Id. at 773.
98. Id. at 774-75
99. Id. at 781-82.
100. Id.at 783.
101. Barron & Lederman, supra note 95, at 785-86.
102. Debate in North Carolina Ratifying Convention, 28 July 1788, in 4 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION 7, 7-8 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
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navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states,
when called into the service of the United States. A power similar to
that of the king of England and of the stadtholder of Holland, before
the late revolution; yet qualified, by some important restrictions,
which I believe were not found in either of those governments.103
Justice Story also noted the important differences between thinking about
the commander in chief in England versus the United States.
Yet the clause did not wholly escape animadversion in the state
conventions. The propriety of admitting the president to be
commander-in-chief, so far as to give orders, and have general
superintendency, was admitted. But it was urged, that it would be
dangerous to let him command in person without any restraint, as he
might make a bad use of it."'
Finally, even Hamilton noted differences,0 5 stating in FederalistNo. 69:
"in this article, therefore, the power of the President would be inferior to
that of either the Monarch or governor." 116
The term commander-in-chief, similar to the concepts of
constitutionalism, representation, sovereignty, and property, has acquired
unique meanings in the United States compared to their understanding in
England. While history may be a guide to how the term was understood,
such a history is not definitive. Moreover, it is not clear how historical
argument factors into constitutional understanding, argument, or precedent.
This is true whether it be British history, American colonial experiences, or
the practices under the Washington administration.
Another problem with drawing upon the practices of the Washington
administration resides in claims that suggest that Washington's actions must
be constitutional because no one objected to what he did. There are several
problems here. First, if in fact as Yoo stated the Constitution and the
presidency was designed with Washington in mind, such a cult of
personality may have foreclosed individuals from challenging his decisions,
whether they were thought to be constitutional or not. Second, it is not clear
that either Washington or others understood his actions or claims to be
constitutional assertions as opposed to being matters of policy or discretion.
Finally, silence cannot be equated with granting of constitutional legitimacy
or acquiescence, especially when options to challenge a use of discretion or
policy may be limited.'0 7
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Third, and perhaps most importantly, arguments that Washington's
practices either confirm the Framers' intent, or establish constitutional
precedent because no one objected, assume that there were mechanisms to
challenge alleged unconstitutional actions that are similar to what exist
now. Keep in mind that Marbury v. Madison was the first case where the
Court asserted its authority to declare laws unconstitutional."°8 This was in
1803. Prior to that date the concept of judicial review, at least as actually
exercised by the Court, did not exist. There was no clear forum for
challenging acts that were thought to be unconstitutional. The Virginia and
Kentucky Resolutions, authored by Jefferson and Madison, speak to how
two Founders (and at least one constitutional Framer) thought about how
states could veto laws they thought unconstitutional in the absence of other
mechanisms to address this concern.0 9 Hence, the Washington presidency
was a pre-Marbury era where the ability to contest constitutionality was in
doubt, at least in comparison to today.
There is also one more argument that one can raise against elevating the
activities and deeds of the Washington administration into constitutional
precedent. This is the argument that past practices, even if endured for
years, do not equate with constitutionality. Justice Scalia at one time sought
to defend "long-standing traditions" and grant them constitutional
protection." 0 The Court generally rejected this deference."' Simply put,
just because something has always been done in a certain way, or was once
done in a specific way, does not render it constitutional or right.
Discrimination against blacks, women, gays, and members of specific
religious faiths were once accepted and could have been considered longstanding traditions, but that does not make such practices constitutionally
permissible today.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Washington presidency established many firsts, but it is not clear
that practices, decisions, or deeds undertaken by him establish
constitutional precedence. However, for scholars such as Yoo, who seem to
place significant stock in recounting the deeds of Washington and other
presidents, history has constitutional significance. They may be correct, yet
they do not specify how and under what circumstances. Their argument
seems to be that constitutional text, as informed by the intent of the Framers
and then confirmed or supplemented or confirmed by subsequent deeds by
presidents, defines the constitutional precedent for the authority of the chief
executive. However, bald assertion of history as precedent fails as a
satisfactory theory of constitutional argument for the reasons offered in this
article, without guidance or rules to explain how the past serves as a
constitutional precedent for the present or future.

